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Abstract: Internet of Things (IoT) has fundamentally changed the way information technology and 
communication environments work, with significant advantages derived from wireless sensors and 
nanotechnology, among others. While IoT is still a growing and expanding platform, the current 
research in privacy and security shows there is little integration and unification of security and privacy 
that may affect user adoption of the technology because of fear of personal data exposure. The surveys 
conducted so far focus on vulnerabilities based on information exchange technologies applicable to the 
Internet. None of the surveys has brought out the integrated privacy and security perspective centered on 
the user. The aim of this paper is to provide the reader with a comprehensive discussion on the current 
state of the art of IoT, with particular focus on what have been done in the areas of privacy and security 
threats, attack surface, vulnerabilities and countermeasures and to propose a threat taxonomy. IoT user 
requirements and challenges were identified and discussed to highlight the baseline security and privacy 
needs and concerns of the user. The paper also proposed threat taxonomy to address the security 
requirements in broader perspective. This survey of IoT Privacy and Security has been undertaken 
through a systematic literature review using online databases and other resources to search for all 
articles that meet certain criteria, entering information about each study into a personal database, and 
then drawing up tables summarizing the current state of literature. As a result, the paper distills the latest 
developments in IoT privacy and security, highlights the open issues and identifies areas for further 
research.   
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1. Introduction 
The term “Internet of Things (IoT)” was first used in 1999 by Kevin Ashton, a British technology 
pioneer [1]–[6]. According to Kevin Ashton, Internet of Things defines the system of physical objects in 
the world that connect to the internet via a sensor. Internet of Things (IoT) comprises intelligent 
machines that interact with other machines, objects, environments, and infrastructures. This new 
technology has had tremendous impact on people’s lives as it helps people to live and work smarter, as 
well as gain complete control over their lives. In addition to offering smart devices to automate homes, 
IoT is essential to business. IoT provides businesses with a real-time look into how their systems really 




Consequently, this new technological reality involves collection and management of vast volumes of 
data from a rapidly growing network of devices and sensors, processing them and then sharing them 
with other related things. These new interactions create tremendous opportunities for new services. IoT 
enables companies to automate processes and reduce labor costs. It also cuts down on waste and 
improves service delivery, making it less expensive to manufacture and deliver goods, as well as 
offering transparency into customer transactions. As such, IoT is one of the most important technologies 
of everyday life, and it will continue to pick up steam as more businesses realize the potential of 
connected devices to keep them competitive. 
 The IoT global market is expected to witness a tremendous growth with the heterogeneous devices 
reaching 28 billion by end of 2020. The sheer amount of data generated by IoT objects can pose a 
serious threat to people's privacy and security because their activities can be monitored anytime, 
anywhere [7]. The potential security threats that can be used to harm consumers are: (1) unauthorized 
access and improper use of personal information; (2) promotion of attacks on other systems; and (3) the 
increase of security risks.  
The research community is currently engaged in IoT research in several domains of which quite a 
number have been published [2], [8], [9]. However, several issues for further research. For instance,  
Atzori et al., [8], addressed authentication and data integrity concerns in IoT security and suggested the 
development of new software applications to control access to personal data during their life cycle. 
However, their work did not discuss other equally important security concerns such as trust, data privacy 
and access control. Meanwhile, Miorandi et al., [9] identified only three key security issues to be 
investigated: data confidentiality, privacy and trust. They did not give adequate attention to 
authentication, integrity and access control, which were only discussed superficially. Sicari et al., [10] 
divided the security aspects into three categories: security requirements (authentication, confidentiality 
and access control), privacy, and trust. The main limitation of this work is the taxonomy of the IoT, 
which remains unclear and, consequently, the lack of classification of the listed research activities 
according to a clear sorting logic. Riahi et al., [11] considered security issues that may occur due to 
interactions among all the system elements, and analyzed their consequences on the global system. They 
focused their analysis on specific interactions which are directly related to security: privacy, trust, 
identification, and access control. They however did not consider other interactions such as 
autoimmunity, safety, reliability and responsibility that are effected during the system design phase as 
they do not involve enhancing technologies. Farooq et al., [1] analyzed the security issues and 
challenges and provided well-defined security architecture to guarantee the user’s privacy and security  
to encourage wider adoption of IoT by masses. Specifically, they addressed authentication, integrity, 
data confidentiality and data privacy as elements of the IoT security. However, this was not 
comprehensive enough as they left out trust and access control.  Neshenko et al., [12] while having nine 
IoT vulnerability classes only considered two main vulnerabilities, that is, unnecessarily open ports, and 
weak programming practices coupled with improper software update capabilities as being responsible 
for most IoT attacks. The other vulnerabilities were accorded lesser attention. This paper seeks to 
comprehensively address the main limitations of existing work which can be summarized as: 
identification, authentication, data integrity, trust, data confidentiality, access control, data privacy and 
data availability. 
Therefore, the main objective of this paper is to provide the reader with a comprehensive discussion on 
the current state of the art of IoT, with particular focus on what have been done in the areas of privacy 
and security threats, attack surface, vulnerabilities and countermeasures and to propose a threat 
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taxonomy. This paper examines the privacy and security of the IoT from the users’ point of view, 
addresses the security requirements on a wider dimension and frames the IoT security framework taking 
into account the resource constraints of the IoT devices. By fusing IoT architecture with privacy and 
security principles, the paper proposes IoT threat taxonomy. The paper brings out the latest 
developments in IoT privacy and security, highlighting the open issues and suggestions for further 
research.  As a result, the contributions of this paper are as follows: The paper: a) provides an overview 
of Internet of Things concepts, architecture, technology and applications relating to IoT with intent to 
establish the connection between IoT privacy and security from the users’ perspective; b) provides a 
systematic summary of IoT user security requirements and challenges and analyzes how the security and 
privacy of users is implemented within the IoT framework; c) tabulates known and documented attack 
surfaces, threats, vulnerabilities and recommended measures toward securing IoT devices; d) develops a 
threat taxonomy for the IoT system that  classifies threats and vulnerabilities in categories of low, 
medium, and high with regard to their contribution to data privacy and security of IoT users; and finally, 
e) identifies countermeasures and links them to threats, vulnerabilities. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 describes how the review was conducted. 
Section 3 describes the IoT concept and presents the need for user centric security and privacy design. 
Section 4 reviews current research on privacy and security of IoT and identifies threats and 
vulnerabilities. Section 5 highlights the mitigation measures against IoT vulnerabilities. Section 6 
presents the proposed threat taxonomy while section 7 presents important research issues for future 
research. Finally, Section 8 concludes the survey.  
2. Literature Survey Process 
This survey adopts a mixture of qualitative and quantitative systematic literature review approach to the 
problem. According to [13], this method has advantages over the narrative style. It can also identify 
areas covered by existing studies and highlight gaps. Get closer to literature from various perspectives 
and promote new insights.  
This IoT privacy and security survey uses an online database and other resources to find all articles that 
meet specific criteria, enter information about each study in a personal database and summarize the 
current state of the table. It was conducted through a systematic review of the literature [13], [14].  
• Identify Databases: Published academic journals have become resources from which electronic 
databases such as Google Scholar, Web of Science, Research Gate and Science Direct are used 
for collection.  
• Choose Keywords: Keywords used for the searches were ‘Internet of Things’, ‘IoT’, ‘privacy’, 
‘security’, ‘IoT Privacy’, ‘IoT Security’, ‘IoT Models’, and ‘IoT threat taxonomy’.  
• Choose Time Range: The research was limited to articles published between 2010 and 2020.  
• Choose Exclusion Criteria: Research focused on academic articles published in English. We 
also considered news articles, stories and annual reports touching on privacy and security of IoT.  
• Searching & Recording: Each paper was recorded based on author of information, the year of 
publication and the journal in which the study was conducted. Subsequently, each article was 
classified according to the method used and whether the analysis was quantitative, qualitative or 
mixed. Privacy, threats, violations and awareness of the various technologies were also recorded.  
• Identifying Privacy and Security Gaps: The analysis was performed to identify privacy and 
security gaps and make recommendations for future studies. 
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For this paper, all the scientific papers were accumulated from online resources. Digital databases such 
as IEEE Xplore, Google Scholar, Science Direct, ERIC and the ACM Digital Library are used to obtain 
scientific articles for this survey. The chosen literature, as well as the keywords used for search process 
was IoT Privacy, IoT Security, IoT Models, Principles, Requirements, Challenges, and IoT threat 















Figure 1: Systematic Literature Review Process 
 
3. Internet of Things and User Centricity 
3.1 Overview of IoT 
The IoT is a technological phenomenon generated by innovative advancements in information and 
communication technologies related to ubiquity, pervasiveness and Intelligence [15]. The Internet of 
Things is a global concept that requires a general, specific, and acceptable definition. The ITU-T 13 
research team explains  Internet of Things (IoT) as data that provides advanced services by connecting 
things (physical and virtual) based on existing and evolving communication and information 
technologies [16]. Figure 2 shows IoT that connects people and things anytime, anywhere, anywhere, 




















Figure 2:  IoT Definition[17] 
The IoT requires a seamless flow of information that is enabled by a secure environment between 
devices that ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability and that the information is not 
compromised. The information passes through the IoT architectural layers which include perception, 
network and application layers [16], [18], [19]. The IoT technology impacts several application areas. 
IoT is used in the design of smart environments and devices that include smart cities and smart health 
among others[20]. Applications can be classified according to network availability, coverage level, 
resolution, non-uniformity, repeatability, user engagement, and impact types. Some of the application 
domains include transportation, retail, healthcare, smart home and energy applications [21]. 
The deployment and implementation of IoT-based products and services rely on several technologies 
such as RFID, wireless sensor networks (WSN), middleware, cloud computing, and IoT application 
software [22]. The range of technologies that make up the IoT determine how users can come to interact 
with IoT devices. In the case of devices utilizing RFID, for example, identifying information can be 
shared in a similar way to reading a bar code. Other IoT devices, however, may require users to program 
their IoT devices using a mobile application. In this context, humans are increasingly incorporating 
Internet-enabled technologies into their everyday lives. For example, smart refrigerators allow 
individuals to use smartphones to schedule hot water to be dispensed, and a smart office building can 
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adjust lighting and temperature to suit workers’ preferences based on input received from them or from 
sensors  [2]. 
The number of actions that can be automated by different devices with distinct user populations is 
substantial. These devices can be referred to as being part of the “Internet of things” (IoT), a network in 
which objects share and communicate information with other elements [2]. Although the IoT allows for 
the transfer of data between devices and many other components, the interconnected nature of the IoT 
embeds security blind spots that can ultimately leave the devices in IoT susceptible to hacking thereby 
leading to security and privacy concerns for IoT users. 
Researchers have suggested that security issues related to the IoT can be addressed by taking several 
countermeasures focused on securing accurate data and transferring these data with protection [23]. 
Such methods include, but are not limited to, performing a more thorough analysis of home router 
network traffic [24]and increasing device encryption efforts [25]. Unfortunately, most researchers fail to 
consider that users are regarded as the weakest link in the cybersecurity chain [26], and very  few 
researchers have commented on the value of designing IoT devices with the user as an integral security 
component [23], [27]. This oversight can prove to be dangerous, as failing to consider the ever-present 
human component of the system has the potential to render any state-of-the-art security mechanism 
useless. As such, we argue that to ensure users’ safety, researchers and designers must take a human 
factors approach to cybersecurity in which the human in the loop [28] is considered through-out the 
design and implementation process. Therefore, the current trends in Internet-enabled technologies need 
to be considered during the design process to ensure users’ privacy and security is addressed. The 
insights in this paper will be useful to designers and developers who are expected to champion privacy 
by design principle so as to assure users that their information is secure from hackers. 
3.2 Toward User-Centric IoT Security and Privacy 
The IoT is a vision of ubiquitous connectivity. With sensors, code, and infrastructure, any object can 
become networked. Most of the discussion about IoT revolves around smart objects while the user is 
relegated to the periphery. Therefore, there is need to shift attention to smart people. This would 
potentially place users at the center of IoT solutions. The user is in this context a human, defined by 
different characteristics: name, age, job, school level, but also interests, domains of expertise and 
preferences. This builds the user’s profile which could be represented in a computer system. The user is 
also represented by the context that evolves. A user context includes location, current activity, objects 
and other users in proximity but also social context. The social context of a user is represented by a set 
of social relationships with other users and forming the user’s social networks. 
In intelligent systems, the user plays several roles, i.e., the source of information, the provider of 
services, and the consumer. The user is therefore at the heart of these processes. That is why some 
paradigms have appeared giving focus to the user. Several works focus on detecting user profile [29], 
user social characteristics [30], [31] and to adapting treatments and processes to user context [32]. This 
paper posits that such works can be reused to achieve a user-centric IoT. 
Miranda et al. [33] define the Internet of People (IoP) as bringing the IoT closer to people in order to 
easily integrate into it and fully exploit its benefits. This could provide a mechanism for serving user’s 
contextual information as it places people at the center of innovation strategies. More than just smart 
applications and smart cities, the potential of IoP resides in smart people. IoP includes numerous topics, 
such as Biometric Sensors and Identification Technology, Wearable Technology, Brain Informatics 
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Processing, Body Area Network technology, Social Computing, and Collective Intelligence, Technology 
for Biomedical and healthcare application etc. Miranda et al. define a set of features they believe are 
essential foundations for any approach to the IoP: The features are: (i) IoP should be social and let 
devices interact with each other and with people more socially than does the IoT; (ii) IoP should be 
personalized which mean that interactions must be personalized to users sociological profiles and 
contexts; (iii) IoP should be proactive and not manually commanded by the user; (iv) IoP should be 
predictable which means that interactions must be triggered according to a predictable context that the 
user has previously identified, and for which a specific behavior has been defined. 
In the IoT environment, user-centricity is concerned with empowering users to take control of their 
access control and privacy preferences to govern devices. This is because users express their fears about 
the privacy of their personal data and do not trust connected objects. On the other hand, IoP brings in the 
integration of technology into people’s everyday lives. For example, the user must set parameters within 
the application, and when the person’s context changes, they must manually reconfigure to reflect the 
new changes. User-centricity puts people (users) in control of their own information and contextual 
integrity. It allows the Internet to become an Internet, not of smart things, but of smart empowered 
people. 
4. Recent Advances in IoT Privacy and Security  
This section reviews the literature on the recent advances in IoT privacy and security focusing on the 
users of the IoT. The users of IoT systems and devices face various privacy and security challenges. 
While the research in IoT is still at infancy, there is literature to show that some significant research is 
going on in this field. This section therefore explores the state of the art in IoT privacy and security with 
a focus on the user. 
4.1 IoT Security 
How we deal with the security of the IoT will determine if it transforms the way we live and work. 
While security was a problem with the traditional Internet, security considerations in the IoT 
environment presented new and unique security challenges. Addressing these challenges and ensuring 
the security of IoT products and services should be a top priority. Users should be confident that IoT 
devices and related data services are safe from vulnerabilities, especially as this technology has become 
more prevalent and integrated in our daily lives. The main challenge is the integration of security 
mechanisms and user acceptance. The user should feel that he is controlling any information related to 
them instead of feeling that the system is controlling them. This integration generates new requirements 
that, to the best of our knowledge, have not been considered before. 
The IoT is extremely vulnerable to attacks for several reasons. First, its components are always 
unattended making physical attack easy. Second, most of the communications are wireless, which makes 
eavesdropping extremely simple. Finally, most of the IoT components are characterized by low 
capabilities in terms of both energy and computing resources and, thus, they cannot implement complex 
schemes supporting security[8], [34]. 
In the context of the IoT, security concerns the protection of connected devices and networks. IoT 
protection protects against unauthorized access to data, Internet threats, denial-of-service attacks, 
unauthorized access to services, theft or alteration of data, malicious attacks and network security. 
However, IoT's ability to connect multiple networked automatic devices over the Internet and the ability 
to interact and manage remotely is likely to lead to the spread of malicious attacks [35]–[37].  
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In the IoT environment, as well as in traditional areas of the Internet, it is important to ensure the 
confidentiality, integrity, reliability and availability of data and information [38]. In this connection, the 
security requirements of IoT systems should provide data validation, intrusion resistance, access control 
and customer privacy. Relying on smart devices that are interconnected in all areas of our lives creates 
opportunities for intrusions and interventions that can compromise personal privacy or threaten public 
safety. 
In recent years, a series of surveys covering the IoT research process have been published[2], [8], [9]. 
They focus on general IoT issues or models [11]. The survey of a broad number of published works led 
to the conclusion that despite numerous attempts in this field, many challenges and research questions 
remain open. In particular, Sicari et al., [10] stressed the fact that a systematic and a unified vision to 
guarantee IoT security is still lacking especially one that focuses on the human user.  
4.1.1 IoT Security Concerns 
In [8], the authors focused on authentication and data integrity concerns, and proposed research 
directions for problems, such as a proxy attack and man-in-the-middle attack. Concerning privacy, they 
suggested developing new software applications to control access to personal data during their life cycle. 
Although the survey is complete and interesting, it provides insufficient details about security challenges 
in the IoT. Miorandi et al., [9] said that many challenges arise in security but they identified only three 
key issues i.e. data confidentiality, privacy and trust. Conversely, they did not give adequate attention to 
authentication, integrity, and access control. In [2] the authors presented a cloud centric vision for the 
IoT and illustrated the enabling technologies and application domains of the future. They proposed 
many research issues based but did not discuss security research issues in depth and their discussions 
were limited to superficial questions regarding privacy and identity protection. 
In [10], the authors adopted an open IoT vision and considered a set of intelligent objects that cooperate 
to accomplish a common objective. They averred that IoT deployments may involve diverse 
conceptions, technologies, implementations and architectures to build a communication or to perform a 
process. They divided the security aspects into three categories: security requirements (authentication, 
confidentiality and access control), privacy, and trust. The main limitation of this work is the taxonomy 
of the IoT, which remains unclear and, consequently, the lack of classification of the listed research 
activities according to a clear sorting logic. Riahi et al., [11] proposed a systemic and cognitive approach 
for IoT security to cover all that is consistent with the IoT framework. They considered security issues 
that may occur due to interactions among all the system elements, and analyzed their consequences on 
the global system. The authors focused their analysis on specific interactions which are directly related 
to security: privacy, trust, identification, and access control. They however did not consider other 
interactions that are effected during the system design phase as they do not involve enhancing 
technologies. 
Farooq et al., [1] in their study analyzed the security issues and challenges and provided well-defined 
security architecture as a confidentiality of the user’s privacy and security. They contend that because of 
the easy accessibility of the objects, they could be easily exploited by the evil-minded hackers. Further, 
Farooq et al., opined that since the devices have a direct impact on the lives of users, security 
considerations must be a high priority coupled with well-defined security infrastructure with new 
systems and protocols that can limit the possible threats related to privacy and security of IoT.  
Specifically, they addressed authentication, integrity, data confidentiality and data privacy as elements 
of the IoT security. Their study did not explore in detail authentications, risk assessment and intrusion 
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detection techniques. Meanwhile, Abdur et al., [39] focused on trust, access control and data privacy. 
However, their work did not bring out strongly the user centered element. 
The following therefore highlights the various security concerns within the IoT environment as 
summarized in Table 1. 
a) Identification: It is most important for a smart device to know when it should or should not reveal its 
identity. Providing identity to an adversary can be a serious threat [10]. However, we must obtain a 
system that, at the same time, provides device identity to other qualified devices. Devices that 
interact with users (humans) must know their identity and be able to distinguish them too[8], [2], 
[11].  
b) Authentication: Authentication is difficult as it usually requires appropriate authentication 
infrastructures and servers that achieve their goal through the exchange of appropriate messages with 
other nodes. In the IoT such approaches are not feasible given that passive RFID tags cannot 
exchange too many messages with the authentication servers. The same reasoning applies to the 
sensor nodes as well [8], [11], [10], [1]. 
c) Data Integrity: Cybercriminals can be affected by a variety of other factors beyond their control, 
such as data changes during the transition and server outages and electromagnetic interference [11]. 
Data integrity is the use of common surveillance methods to protect this useful information from 
cybercriminals and to prevent external interference during transmission and reception. Thus, the 
system cannot change the data without identifying the threat [1]. Methods used to ensure data 
accuracy and reliability include checksums and cyclic redundancy checks (CRC)  used through error 
detection mechanisms [8], [10] 
d) Trust: Trust is a multidimensional, multidisciplinary, and multifaceted concept. The concept of trust 
covers a bigger scope than security, thus it is more complicated and difficult to establish[8]. It is also 
related to the concept of privacy that is the ability of an entity to determine whether, when, and to 
whom personal information could be disclosed[11] [39]. A number of studies aim to improve 
identity trust and achieve privacy preservation in ubiquitous systems such as IoT. It is widely 
believed that a user will adopt and use the IoT technology based on the belief that the devices are 
secured by the manufacturers[9] [10]. 
e) Data Confidentiality: Data confidentiality secures the user and ensures that confidential information 
is trusted by using various mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure [1]. Security mechanisms 
that ensure data privacy include data encryption that protects data from unauthorized access, two-
stage authentication that provides authentication by two dependent components, and biometric 
authentication, each of which is uniquely identified [1], [35]. For IoT-based devices, this ensures that 
sensor networks do not show the data of sensor nodes to neighboring nodes as well as transmitting 
the data of labels to an unauthorized reader [1], [9], [35], [40]. 
f) Access Control: Access control refers to the permissions in the usage of resources, assigned to 
different actors of a wide IoT network. Access control should focus on IoT capabilities, rather than 
on a per-device granularity because factors affecting access-control decisions are heavily context-
dependent. A number of steps should be taken to provide the requisite access control specification 
and authentication for the smart device[11][39] .  
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g) Data Privacy: Due to the proliferation of increased amounts of data in an IoT environment, the 
existing challenge that data will be used for purposes in addition to or other than those originally 
specified becomes even more serious to consider. The IoT environment has devices, sensors, 
readers, and applications which have the potential to collect a multiplicity of data types of 
individuals as they move through such environments. There is a possibility of individuals being 
identified because of the aggregated data. The information collected based on object identifiers, 
sensor data and the connection capabilities of IoT systems might therefore reveal information on 
individuals, their habits, location, interests and other personal information and other preferences 
stored for ease of use in systems [8], [2], [11], [39], [9], [10], [1]. 
h) Data Availability: IoT provides data to its users when necessary. The availability of data allows the 
authorized person to have immediate access to information sources, not only under normal 
circumstances but also in catastrophic conditions [8], [41]. Implementing a firewall prevents denial 
of service (DoS) attacks and denies the availability of end user data. Backups and backup methods 
provide various system failovers to ensure system component replication in the event of a system 
failure or to ensure data reliability and availability [8]. 
Table 1: Summary of Surveys on Security of Internet of Things  
Security Concerns [8]  [2] [11] [39] [9] [10] [1] 
Identification √ √ √ × × √ × 
Authentication √ × √ × × √ √ 
Data Integrity √ × √ × × √ √ 
Trust √ × √ √ √ √ × 
Data Confidentiality × × √ × √ √ √ 
Access Control × × √ √ × × × 
Data Privacy √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Data Availability √ × × × × × × 
Legend: √ Covers the security concern.  × Does not cover the security concern 
 
4.1.2 IoT Security Requirements 
The IoT security requirements of researchers and security experts present a dilemma as authentication 
and trust directly conflict with confidentiality standards [42]. According to [1], the security requirements 
are best addressed using a generic IoT architecture at four key levels of perception, network, middle-
ware and application. In this architecture security issues are identified as authentication, data privacy, 
routing security, data security, intrusion prevention, risk assessment, authentication and privacy of 
sensitive information. However, trust and identity management are lacking in the requirements. IoT 
security requirements such as integrity, information protection, confidentiality, disclaimer, freshness, 
authentication, authorization, access control, exception management, accessibility, fault tolerance and 
personal organization are highlighted in [43].   
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Babar et al., [43 claim that the most important security requirements include authentication and 
monitoring, data and information integrity, mutual trust and confidentiality ]. IoT devices are mobile and 
often connect to the Internet through various wireless channels, such as Bluetooth, 802.11, WiMAX, 
Zigbee, GSM / UMTS. Using such a wireless connection, an attacker can block unique low-level 
identifiers such as Bluetooth and 802.11 device addresses [44]. 
Amine  et al., [45] provide an overview of the authentication protocols used in the IoT context, including 
Machine Communication (M2M), Vehicle Internet of Things (IoV), Energy Internet of Things (IoE), 
and Internet Sensors (including IoS). Their research presented authentication protocols that did not solve 
authentication and privacy issues, but suggested the complexity and overhead of communication by 
using recommended methods or improving formal methods of security testing.   
We note that human user security requirements have not been addressed in IoT security surveys thereby 
making the surveys incomplete. To provide a complete overview, we consolidate these IoT security 
requirements and divide them into four groups, namely: network security, identity management, privacy, 
and trust. Obviously, in terms of network security, constrained resources should have the strongest 
connection, mainly due to restrictions that apply to traditional security mechanisms, for example, 
encryption. Moreover, identity management is affected by the heterogeneity of the Internet of Things. 
Privacy is primarily related to scalability and limited resources as restrictions are placed on technology 
that can be used. Additionally, the uncensored environment and the heterogeneity of the Internet of 
Things have a serious impact on trust [40]. 
a) Network Security: Network security requirements are divided into confidentiality, authenticity, 
integrity, and availability. Interconnecting the devices require better confidentiality which could be 
accorded through IPSec and Transport Layer Security (TLS) [46]. Authenticity confirms that the 
connection established is with an authenticated entity and authenticity also includes integrity of data 
but can be required separately to detect and recover failures so mechanisms such as TCP and TLS 
suffice this requirement. Availability ensures that IoT service is available in case overhead exceeds 
the resource constraints of things. It also ensures the survivability of IoT services to authorized 
parties when needed despite denial-of-service attacks. It also ensures that it has the capability to 
provide a minimum level of services in the event of disruptions [43]. 
b) Privacy: Privacy is considered to be one of main challenges in IoT [47] due to the involvement of 
humans and increasingly ubiquitous data collection. Privacy of data includes transmitting and 
sharing of confidential information without exposing the user’s identity. This requirement is 
considered as big challenge as almost every other sensing device collect personal information and 
large amount of such data becomes Personally Identifiable Information (PII) when combined 
together; enough to identify a person [47]–[49] 
c) Identity Management: A comprehensive attention should be given for identity management in IoT 
due to the number of devices and the complex relationship between devices, services, owners and 
users [47], [50], [51]. Methods for authentication, authorization including revocation, and 
accountability or non-repudiation are required. There may be multiple domain scenarios in IoT, 
authorization solutions, e.g., Kerberos [44], [52], [53]  assume a single domain that encloses devices, 
owners, users, and services. Therefore, new authorization solutions that work with untrusted devices, 
allow delegation of access across domains, and capable of quick revocation are needed.  
d) Trust Management: Accountability in trust management ensures that every action is clearly bound to 
an authenticated entity. It must be capable to deal with huge amounts of entities, delegation of 
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access, actions that span organizational domains along with continuous derivation of data [10]. Trust 
management should act as self-organizing component in order to deal with the information flow and 
preventing the privacy information from leaking to untrusted devices. The authors in [54] make use 
of fuzzy set theory and formal semantics-based language to perform the layered trust mechanism, 
evaluated by using specific layer attributes (i.e., efficiency, risk, history). The user has access to the 
IoT only if security credential satisfies security policies, which are defined by means of a decision-
making function according to user trust value. 
From the surveyed literature, user IoT security requirements are partially covered under privacy, identity 
management and trust management. This is quite limiting considering that human users interact with the 
smart devices all the time. Confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and availability covered under network 
security with a bias toward device security, are equally important for user security and should have been 
discussed and analyzed. while users who are directly affected have not been considered  
4.1.3 IoT Security Challenges  
Although a number of studies have been conducted as shown in the literature to protect IoT applications, 
still there is a big security hole in IoT environment. IoT security issues and challenges have been 
analyzed in [1], [11], [60], [35], [43], [50], [55]–[59]. To successfully implement and deploy smart 
devices, trust in IoT must be assured. This therefore requires that the ecosystem employs a collaborative 
and unified approach to IoT security.  This is subject to serious security challenges facing the ubiquity of 
this technology. A number of researchers have explored ways of making IoT safe for users. Nitti et al 
[34] conducted a study on the acceptance of IoT objects by users. 43% of users queried say they are 
afraid of the use that can be made of their personal data. 18 % find that the connected objects are not 
operational. 8% believe they are unreliable. Falcone and Sapienza [61] proposed a model for the users’ 
acceptance of IoT systems. The proposed model uses the concepts of trust and control as a starting point, 
with particular reference to the feedback. The authors were able to precisely classify the tasks an IoT 
device can do according to the autonomy the user grants. They further provided a theoretical framework 
for the device–user relationship, formalizing their interaction. It is in fact a complex interaction: on the 
one hand, the device must adapt to the user, on the other hand, it must ensure that the user adapts to it. 
The realized model perfectly responds to these needs. 
From the foregoing, this section therefore identifies a number of IoT security challenges, as defined by 
other researchers, which can be considered as open issues for future research directions. A summary of 
the related works found in literature is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Identified IoT Security Challenges 
Area Challenges References 
Interoperability Relevant security solutions should not interfere with the 





In IoT architecture, most nodes do not have storage capacity, 
power, and processor. They have a low speed connection. 
Therefore, it is impossible to use security methods such as 
frequency shutdown connection and public key cryptographic 





Data volumes Some IoT programs use short and sparse communication 
channels, but many IoTs, such as intuition, logistics, and large 





Many RFID systems do not have an appropriate authentication 
mechanism, so anyone can control the labels and find the 
identifier of the items they are carrying. An attacker not only 
reads the data, but can edit or delete it.  
[1]. 
Scalability The IoT network consists of several nodes. The security 




Traditional computers require users to configure and modify 
different program areas and different communication 
environments. However, objects in the IoT network must 
configure and create the platform on which they work. This type 
of management includes methods and mechanisms such as self-




The absence of central administration for IoT infrastructure 
makes trust management quite challenging. 
[10], [54], 
[66] 
Access Control Access control is essential specially for IoT devices which may 
be located on open areas and physically under control of 
opponents. Contract management plays a centralized role for IoT 
systems in the future generations. Delegation of authority to IoT 
devices has to be considered by an access model to enable 






It includes abnormal network traffic monitoring. Adoption of 
intrusion detection and prevention is a challenge to avoid IoT 




The works studied show that resource constraints play a critical role in the adoption of IoT. This is 
because it determines the slow speed and processing power affects the deployment of strong encryption 
solutions. Further, privacy protection through appropriate authentication mechanisms and trust 
management issues are considered critical. Users are apprehensive about devices that expose their data 
to unauthorized persons. 
4.1.4 IoT Security Threats 
Several studies have been conducted in the field of IoT primarily in the area of IoT security threats. 
However, there are still some open issues that need to be addressed. In this section we discuss some of 
the threats in each architectural layer that needs special attention as shown in Table 3 [35], [37], [41], 
[62], [74]–[76]. The identified threats at each layer are presented from the highest (High) to the lowest 
(Low). The threats at the perception layer are classified with the highest security risk level due to very 
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large hardware limitations that prevent the implementation of robust protection methods of the data 
collected, stored and transmitted. The risk level is also contributed by the heterogeneity of the devices 
within the perception layer which makes the establishment of security and the standardization of 
communication protocols more difficult [35]. At the network layer, threats are classified with risk levels 
ranging from Low-to-Medium due to the known disadvantages of wireless data transfer standards, as 
well as known threats in access networks [77],  [81] .  The threats at the application layer are classified 
with the Medium security risk level [82], [83]. This is because of the large number of users and the data 
to be stored and processed within the layer, as well as the known vulnerabilities of virtualization whose 
exploitation can cause extensive simultaneous damage to a large number of users.  
Table 3: Threats and Security Concerns at each Layer of IoT 
Layer Threats  and Security Challenges Threat Level References  
Perception Eavesdropping. Within the RFID technology, an 
attacker could easily sniff out the confidential 
information like passwords or any other data flowing 
from tag-to-reader or reader-to-tag which makes it 
vulnerable [84]. 
Spoofing. Spoofing is when an attacker broadcasts fake 
information to the RFID systems and makes it assume 
the information is from the original source [1], [35], [85]. 
This way attacker gets full access to the system making it 
vulnerable 
RF Jamming. RFID tags can also be compromised by 
kind of a DoS attack in which communication through 















Network Sybil Attack. Sybil is a kind of attack in which the 
attacker manipulates the node to present multiple 
identities for a single node due to which a considerable 
part of the system can be compromised resulting in false 
information about the redundancy[77]. 
Sinkhole Attack. It is a kind of attack in which the 
adversary makes the compromised node look attractive 
to the nearby nodes due to which all the data flow from 
any particular node is diverted toward the compromised 
node resulting in packets drop i.e. all the traffic is 
silenced while the system is fooled to believe that the 
data has been received on the other side. Moreover this 
attack results in more energy consumption which can 
cause DoS attack [1]. 
Man-in-the-Middle Attack. This is a form of 
Eavesdropping in which target of the attack is the 














[77],  [81]   
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party can monitor or control all the private 
communications between the two parties hideously. The 
unauthorized party can even fake the identity of the 
victim and communicate normally to gain more 
information [1]. 
Denial of Service (DoS) Attack. The kind of attack in 
which the network is flooded with a useless lot of traffic 
by an attacker, resulting in a resource exhaustion of the 
targeted system due to which the network becomes 
unavailable to the users [1], [82], [88]. 
Malicious code Injection. This is a serious kind of 
attack in which an attacker compromises a node to inject 
malicious code into the system which could even result 
in a complete shutdown of the network or in the worst 














Application Sniffing Attack. An attacker can force an attack on the 
system by introducing a sniffer application into the 
system, which could gain network information resulting 
in corruption of the system [1] 
Malicious Code Injection. An attacker can leverage the 
attack on the system from end-user with some hacking 
techniques that allows the attacker to inject any kind of 
malicious code into the system to steal some kind of data 
from the user. 
Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack. DoS attacks nowadays 
have become sophisticated, it offers a smoke screen to 
carry out attacks to breach the defensive system and 
hence data privacy of the user, while deceiving the 
victim into believing that the actual attack is happening 
somewhere else. This put the non-encrypted personal 
details of the user at the hands of the hacker 
Spear-Phishing Attack. It is an email spoofing attack in 
which victim, a high ranking person, is lured into 
opening the email through which the adversary gains 
access to the credentials of that victim and then by a 




















From the literature, it is obvious that threats permeate every layer of the IoT architectural model. Of the 
threats mentioned, malicious code injection and denial-of-service attacks which have high threat levels 
are found in both application and network layers, respectively. Threats such as RF jamming, Sybil 
attack, sinkhole attack and sniffing attack have medium impact while spear phishing is considered to 
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have low impact. These threats could expose the vulnerabilities within the IoT systems and devices 
leading to successful attack on IoT assets. No layer is immune from threats. This means that safeguards 
to protect IoT must be adequately addressed across the architectural layer. At the application layer, the 
user is constantly under threat of malicious code injection, denial-of-service and spear-phishing attacks. 
While malicious code could be initiated from the user-end, denial-of-service targets the user data 
privacy. Spear-phishing on the other hand is used to lure unsuspecting user through email to allow 
access to user credentials. 
4.1.5 IOT Attack Surface 
Many Internet-connected smart devices do not have the proper level of security due to privacy 
protection and data access differences. Thus, the IoT attack zone represents all possible vulnerabilities in 
IoT devices and related programs and infrastructures in a particular network. 
Assigning an IP address to a smart device connected to the Internet provides the function of transmitting 
network data. Deficiencies in these devices provide a platform through which hackers and government 
agencies can access the network, monitor users, and access other connected devices for a variety of 
purposes. The OWASP project has compiled a list of attack zones and their vulnerabilities in the IoT 
environment. This is shown in Table 4 below [89] [90]. 
Table 4: The OWASP IoT Attack Surface Areas [89][90] 
Attack Surface Vulnerability 
Ecosystem Access Control Authentication; Session management; Trust between components; 
Enrollment security; Cancellation system; Lost access procedures 
Device Memory Cleartext usernames; Cleartext passwords; Third-party credentials; 
Encryption keys 
Device Physical Interfaces Firmware extraction; User CLI; Admin CLI; Privilege escalation; 
Reset to insecure state; Removal of storage media 
Device Web Interface SQL injection; Cross-site scripting; Cross-site Request Forgery; 
Username enumeration; Weak passwords; Account lockout; Known 
default credentials 
Device Firmware Hardcoded credentials; Sensitive information disclosure; Sensitive 
URL disclosure; Encryption keys; Firmware version display and/or 
last update date 
Device Network Services Information disclosure; User CLI; Administrative CLI; Injection; 
Denial of Service; Unencrypted Services; Poorly implemented 
encryption; Test/Development Services; Buffer Overflow; UPnP; 
Vulnerable UDP Services; DoS 
Administrative Interface SQL injection; Cross-site scripting; Cross-site Request Forgery; 
Username enumeration; Weak passwords; Account lockout; Known 
default credentials; Security/encryption options; Logging options; 
Two-factor authentication; Inability to wipe device 




Cloud Web Interface SQL injection; Cross-site scripting; Cross-site Request Forgery; 
Username enumeration; Weak passwords; Account lockout; Known 
default credentials; Transport encryption; Insecure password 
recovery mechanism; Two-factor authentication 
Third-party Backend APIs Unencrypted PII sent; Encrypted PII sent; Device information leaked; 
Location leaked 
Update Mechanism Implicitly trusted by device or cloud; Username enumeration; 
Account lockout; Known default credentials; Weak passwords; 
Insecure data storage; Transport encryption; Insecure password 
recovery mechanism; Two-factor authentication 
Vendor Backend APIs Inherent trust of cloud or mobile application; Weak authentication; 
Weak access controls; Injection attacks 
Ecosystem Communication Health checks; Heartbeats; Ecosystem commands; Deprovisioning; 
Pushing updates 
Network Traffic LAN; LAN to Internet; Short range; Non-standard 
 
From Table 4, an analysis of IoT attack surface areas and attendant vulnerabilities indicate that all of the 
major components of IoT systems can be exploited. Security should therefore be a priority in building 
and maintaining IoT systems. Regardless of the scale or the type of environment an IoT system is built 
into, security should be considered from the design phase to better integrate it in every aspect of the 
system. In this way, the IoT system, from its individual devices to its overall configuration, can be 
tailored to be both functional and secure. The discussed attack surface has critical vulnerabilities that 
users ought to be aware of in order to make the right choices when procuring smart devices.   The users 
cannot be expected to perform positive actions to make up for security flaws. 
 
4.2 IoT Privacy 
IoT devices collect, analyse and transmit sensitive data across the network. This data requires adequate 
protection from adversaries while the user should be aware of what private data is being processed.  
4.2.1 Privacy Definition 
Privacy protection is very broad and multifaceted, from which literature review provides a variety of 
explanations and perspectives [41]. Privacy in the Internet of Things is the border where information 
from smart objects is exposed to the outside world. Therefore, privacy is threefold guarantee to the 
subject for [1], [23], [41], [76], [91]: 
• Recognizing the risk of confidentiality imposed by data objects and services around a data object 
• Individual management of personal data collection and processing in smart facilities 
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• Recognizing and managing the use and dissemination of personal information by individuals 
outside of personal management. 
Regardless of the definition adopted, threats to privacy are generally one of the main concerns of users 
and can significantly affect the level of adoption of new technologies. Smart gadgets offer incredible 
value creation and capture opportunities, but their vulnerabilities might cause catastrophic disruptions, 
ranging from privacy breaches to breakdowns of public ecosystems.  
4.2.2 Privacy Principles 
To solve some of the problems that users of IoT products face, it is advisable to give the creators of the 
smart device a concept of privacy by design[92]. Ann Cavoukian [92] posited  that privacy-by-design 
must be underpinned by the following seven principles presented in Table 5: 
Table 5: Privacy Principles 
Principle Explanation 
Proactive not reactive, preventative 
not remedial 
It is designed to prevent the intrusion of privacy. We 
recognize the importance and benefits of routine early and 
consistent adoption of a strong personal life. This includes 
clear commitments at the highest level; privacy commitments 
clearly shared between the user community and stakeholders, 
and established means of recognizing poor privacy designs. 
Privacy as the default setting User does not need to take steps to protect your privacy. It 
will be notified by the following fair information practices: 
• Desired specifications 
• Limit collection 
• Restrictions on use, retention, and disclosure 
Privacy is included in the design It is an integral component of the basic functionality of the 
computer system, not an additional component which is then 
bolted to the system. This includes integration into 
information technology, operations, and architecture in a 
holistic, integrated, and creative way. 
Full functionality – positive-sum, 
not zero-sum 
It avoids compromises between different objectives and seeks 
to achieve all desired objectives (such as confidentiality and 
functionality) with a win-win approach. 
End-to-end security – full lifecycle 
protection 
It is integrated with IT systems before the first data record is 
collected and throughout the life of the data, ensuring that 
information is stored, processed, and destroyed securely at the 
end of the process. 
Visibility and transparency – keep it 
open 
It assures all stakeholders that information is managed in 
accordance with stated commitments and objectives and that 
its components are visibly transparent. 
Respect for user privacy – keep it It avoids compromises between different objectives and seeks 
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user-centric to achieve all the desired (and apparently contradictory) 
objectives (such as confidentiality and functionality) with a 
win-win approach. 
Cavoukian [92] takes a rather generalized concept of privacy by design and the approach lacks clear 
implementation strategies as part of the system design. This paper introduces the following additional 
principles postulated by Hustinx [93]to bridge the gap identified while evaluating the seven principles 
enumerated by [92]. 
1) Data minimization: Proactively prevent privacy risks by systematically minimizing the amount 
of data collected and processed. Therefore, software, information and communications 
technology and systems development should start by default with unidentified interactions and 
processes. Where possible, consistent identifiable and observable personal information should be 
kept to a minimum.  
2) Informed consent: The terms are presented in a clear, relevant and transparent manner. This 
allows users to choose not to share certain information, except to the extent permitted by law. 
The confidentiality of the data determines the quality of the consent required.  
3) Transparency: Provide users with an overview of how data is processed and used. 
4) Verifiable preventive protection: Prevent threats with security measures that can be validated. 
5) Accuracy: Keep accurate, complete and up-to-date personal information necessary to achieve the 
specified objectives. 
6) Possibility to withdraw consent: Easily revoke user consent and give them the ability to delete 
shared information. 
These principles may not ensure the inviolability of users ’personal lives, as the human-machine 
interface must be person-centered, and user-friendly in order to make personal decisions based on 
personal information.  However, failure to apply and enforce privacy-by-design principles exposes the 
IoT environment to a wide range of privacy and security threats such as eavesdropping, spoofing, Sybil 
attack, man-in-the-middle attack, denial-of-service attack, profiling, inventory attacks and lifecycle 
transitions. 
 
4.2.3 Privacy Threats 
With the development of IoT and the diffusion of technology, confidentiality has become a major 
problem. The collection, use, and exchange of user data is common and continues in the Internet of 
Things environment. The  review presented in [47]identifies the most common threats to Internet of 
Things privacy. 
a) Identification is a major threat that associates identifiers such as names and addresses with 
individuals. Basically, we have experience in the back-end services of the reference model in the IT 
phase, with a large amount of information concentrated in a central location beyond the control of 
the subject. However, in IoT, the stages of interaction and data collection are also important, as the 




b) Location and tracking are dangerous for the location of people using various tools such as GPS, 
Internet traffic, location of smartphone, etc. Privacy breaches have been identified, such as GPS 
tracking, disclosure of personal information such as illness or discomfort in monitoring or control.  
c) Profiling is used to personalize electronic commerce (such as newsletters and advertisements). 
Organizations collect information of interest by communicating with other profiles and data sources. 
As IoT evolves, data sources explode every day. In addition, although data collection increases 
quantitatively, the data changes qualitatively due to the collection of previously inaccessible parts of 
an individual's personal life.  
d) Interactions and presentations convey the number of smart items and new ways of communicating 
with the system and feedback to users. This threatens confidentiality, personal information between 
the system and the customer.  
e) Life cycle transitions occur when IoT products are sold, used by their owners, and eventually 
destroyed. It has been established that objects destroy all data, but smart devices often store large 
amounts of historical data over their lifetime. This includes personal photos and videos that are not 
deleted during the transfer of ownership.  
f) Inventory attacks are used to gather information about unauthorized use and access to personal items 
and features. Thieves can use inventory data to find safe time to identify and destroy property.  
g) Linking connections between different systems increases the chances of unauthorized access and 
intrusion of personal data when systems are connected to individual data sources [23], [94].  
The above identified threats confound users of IoT technology especially when users know that the 
devices collect and transmit personal data without their knowledge. Proper mitigation of the privacy 
threats would ultimately encourage users to adopt IoT technology.  
 
4.2.4 Privacy Challenges 
The evolving features and technologies of the IoT along with the emerging systems of the IoT 
interaction have led to specific privacy challenges. For the various threats identified by [47], a number 
of challenges were identified, discussed and classified as shown in Table 6.  
Table 6: Privacy Challenges 
Privacy Threat Threat Level Challenge 
Identification Medium The design of the IoT system allows for centralized 
communication processing and horizontal communication. This 
reduces the identity data available outside the user's personal area 
and reduces the attack vector for identification.  
The challenge is related to associating the identity to a particular 
context that violates the individual’s privacy by providing the 
identifying information to entities outside the user’s personal 
sphere, increasing the possible cyberattack vectors[95]. 
Localization and 
tracking 
Medium The threat is related to the determination and recording of the 
individual’s location across space and time  
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Privacy Threat Threat Level Challenge 
While localization and tracking are already possible through 
various means such as internet traffic and mobile phone GPs 
location, many users may perceive it as a violation of privacy if 
the data is used inappropriately or if they do not have any control 
of the sharing of their location data [95]. As such, the IoT faces a 
challenge in ensuring awareness of tracking and control of the 
localization data. 
Profiling High There is a risk in the compilation of data about users so as to 
determine their interests through correlation with other sources of 
data and profiles [88]. Profiling could lead to privacy violations if 
the data is used for unsolicited ads, price discrimination, and social 
engineering. The challenge is in balancing the interests of the user 
with the requirements of the user's privacy when creating and 
analyzing data profiles. Gathering and sale of user profiles in the 
data marketplace without the individual’s consent is also 





Medium Majority of the mechanisms used to interact with the user and 
present feedback information are inherently public in nature, 
posing a threat to the individual’s privacy in case other people can 
observe the data [39]. Thus, the IoT must solve the challenge 
posed by the easy visibility of personal user data. 
Lifecycle 
transitions 
Medium The users’ private information collected during the IoT device’s 
lifetime may be disclosed during changes to the gadget’s control 
spheres during their lifecycle [96]. The smart devices interact with 
numerous services and persons and amass the data on such 
interactions in their history logs. Considering that the lifecycle of 
most consumer goods is based on the customer owning the 
products forever, the sale or sharing of such devices could result in 
the buyer accessing sensitive data about the previous owner, thus 
violating the individual’s privacy. 
Inventory attack Low As the IoT interconnection capacities evolve with the development 
of end-to-end vision, the smart devices can be queried over the 
internet by both legitimate and non-legitimate parties. When the 
IoT gadgets are queried by the non-legitimate entities, the latter 
may exploit the device to collect unauthorized information 
regarding the characteristics and existence of the user’s personal 
effects [59]. Thus, the IoT can allow for the disclosure of 
comprehensive data about the users’ life and belongings, posing a 
threat to their privacy.  
A mechanism that provides tolerance to fingerprints is necessary 
to prevent passive inventory attacks based on fingerprints from 
something intelligent. It will certainly be difficult to resist 
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Privacy Threat Threat Level Challenge 
inventory attacks. Although PET was designed to protect privacy, 
the fact that it can make fingerprints even easier is currently not 
the most appropriate, but most appropriate, solution among the 
masses [93]. 
Linkage Low First, the transparency of the information that the system share is 
important for user approval. 
Second, adjusting the authorization and use management model is 
required for many stakeholders working in the respective system. 
Third, the data anonymization method should work for each 
system and be reliable for multiple combinations of different data 
sets [23], [94]. 
 
The seven privacy threats are classified based on threat levels from low to high. Privacy remains a major 
challenge on IoT that should be addressed if the technology is to gain acceptance from users. Among the 
privacy threats whose challenges have been enumerated, it is profiling that remains one of the most 
severe threats with a rating of high. Our analysis shows that it is greatly aggravated and that other threats 
like identification or tracking, though each provoking different and very specific privacy violations at 
medium level, add to its dangers by supplying even more linkable data. It is worth noting that business 
models that depend heavily on profiling have enjoyed tremendous success and so the trend for big data 
continues, fueled by the IoT’s central promise for fine-grained and ubiquitous data collection. Here, the 
challenge consists in designing privacy-aware solutions for the IoT that allow balancing business 
interests and customers’ privacy requirements. Privacy threats such as interaction and presentation, and 
lifecycle transactions are rated medium as they too have an effect on user profiling. Linkage and 
inventory attacks have low threat rating. 
4.2.5 IoT Vulnerabilities 
Vulnerabilities are flaws in systems or projects that allow illegal users to give instructions, access 
unauthorized data or perform denial of service attacks [97]. Vulnerabilities are present in various areas 
of the IoT system. This can be in hardware or software, system weaknesses and policies used by the 
system or users of the system itself [98]. 
Neshenko et al., [12] proposed nine IoT vulnerability classes. These classes include deficient physical 
security, insufficient energy harvesting, inadequate authentication, improper encryption, unnecessary 
open ports, insufficient access control, improper patch management capabilities, weak programming 
practices and insufficient audit mechanisms. However, the authors concluded that most IoT attacks are 
possible because of two main vulnerabilities in IoT, that is, unnecessarily open ports, and weak 
programming practices coupled with improper software update capabilities. They further point out that 
insufficient IoT access controls and audit mechanisms enable attackers to generate IoT-centric malicious 
activities in a highly stealthy manner. 
Granjal et al., [99] performed exhaustive analysis on the security protocols and mechanisms available to 
protect communications on the IoT networks. They focused on vulnerabilities and attacks targeting the 
IoT networks.  They also highlighted on ongoing work aimed at securing those protocols. The authors 
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identified some security challenges at each of the layers. At the physical layer, protocols (e.g., IEEE 
802.15.4) do not specify a key model (i.e., a model for generating, distributing, storing, and replacing 
cryptographic keys), because it depends largely on the resources available on the IoT devices to support 
key management operations. At the network layer, routing protocols (e.g., Routing Protocol for Low-
Power and Lossy Networks or RPL) offer security against external attacks only, and are not resilient 
against internal attacks. And finally, at the application layer, protocols (e.g., Constrained Application 
Protocol or CoAP) lack appropriate key management mechanisms for multicast communication. 
Celik et al., [58] studied privacy and security issues related to IoT program analysis. They analyzed a 
number of systems for five major IoT programming platforms (Samsung’s SmartThings, OpenHAB, 
Apple’s HomeKit, Google’s Android Things, and Amazon AWS IoT). The authors concluded that: (1) 
the dominant IoT programming platforms structure their apps around a sensor-computation-actuator 
idiom; (2) a suite of analysis tools and algorithms targeted at diverse IoT platforms is at this time largely 
absent; (3) because IoT applications control physical processes through devices, security and privacy 
issues are more subtle and difficult to identify than in related fields; (4) most approaches lack multiple 
analysis sensitivities such as path- and context-sensitivity; (5) most approaches often do not consider 
security and safety problems in multi-app environments and through information flows in trigger-action 
platforms; (6) members of the research community often use the SmartThings platform to evaluate their 
tools, as numerous open-source official and third-party apps are available; and (7) IoT systems often 
implement algorithms on the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) of a SmartThings app because of the 
constraints on Groovy language and proprietary back-end libraries. 
In 2018, The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) updated its top ten IoT vulnerabilities 
[100]. The list includes: a) weak, guessable, or hardcoded passwords; b) insecure network services; c) 
insecure ecosystem interfaces; d) lack of secure update mechanism; e) use of insecure or outdated 
components; f) insufficient privacy protection; g) insecure data transfer and storage; h) lack of device 
management; i) insecure default settings; and j) lack of physical hardening. 
The OWASP project is intended to encourage and assist manufacturers to build their devices with 
security in mind and therefore make their devices secure by design. Its goal is to help organizations and 
individuals gauge the acceptable risk and take appropriate actions to mitigate them. 
The OWASP top 10 IoT list of vulnerabilities does not come with separate guidelines for various 
stakeholders but instead takes a unified approach to address IoT vulnerabilities that might be affecting 
IoT devices. The OWASP IoT top 10 project team avoided specific IoT security vulnerability 
guidelines.  
For this study, we consider and discuss the following key vulnerabilities which pose the highest security 
threat to IoT ecosystem: 
 
a) Weak credentials and lack of strong authentication mechanisms  
In 2010, Cui et al. [101] conducted Internet-scale probing and uncovered more than half a million 
embedded devices with default credentials. Most of these devices belonged to government 
organizations, large enterprises, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and educational institutions. Two 
years later, in 2012, the Carna botnet revealed that there were more than 1.2 million devices online 
with no or default credentials [102].  
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b) Open Ports 
A major concern to the security of IoT networks is the significant number of devices with 
unnecessarily open ports. Czyz et al. [103] showed that a large number of IoT devices are only 
reachable over IPv6, and various IoT protocols are more accessible over IPv6 than over IPv4 (e.g., 
6LoWPAN). They discovered that a given IPv6 port is almost always more open than the same port is 
in IPv4. For example, IPv6 had 5% more open SSH ports, and 46% more open Telnet ports as 
compared to IPv4. They also concluded that there was a systemic failure in organizations to deploy 
consistent security policies for their devices as it pertains to port blocking. Lastly, the authors 
debunked the belief that the security threat of open ports in IPv6 is dampened due to the infeasibility 
of IPv6 network-wide scanning by discovering high-value hosts through scanning alone. 
c) Weak programming practices 
Although strong programming practices and injecting security components might increase the 
resiliency of the IoT, many researchers have reported that countless firmware are released with known 
vulnerabilities such as backdoors, root users as prime access points, and the lack of Secure Socket 
Layer (SSL) usage. Hence, an adversary might easily exploit known security weaknesses to cause 
buffer overflows, information modifications, or gain unauthorized access to the 
device[104][105][106].  
d) Data Leakage 
IoT applications are also prone to data leakage vulnerabilities. Celik et al. [107] conducted static taint 
analysis on 230 SmartThings applications, and found that 138 of the applications exposed at least one 
piece of sensitive data via the Internet or messaging services. Furthermore, the authors showed that 
half of the analyzed applications leak at least three different sensitive data sources, such as device 
info, devices state, user input, etc., to the Internet or messaging services. 
e) Improper encryption 
While it is clear that encryption can help to address some of the vulnerabilities presented in [108], 
complex cryptographic functions, such as those found in the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), 
can result in large overhead for resource-constrained IoT devices. As a result, there is a growing 
interest in ultra-lightweight, but secure encryption algorithms optimized for low-powered hardware. 
However, as Singh et al. [109] pointed out, hardware-based encryption engines have a significant 
vulnerability: the power dissipation of the hardware can be measured while performing encryption, 
and later statistically analyzed to recover the secret key, thus compromising the device. Many 
countermeasures have been proposed to address this vulnerability in AES engines. Unfortunately, 
these countermeasures incur significant power and performance overheads, and therefore are not 
suitable for lightweight cryptographic primitives. 
The reviewed literature has uncovered some inadequacies that this paper addresses. For instance, this 
paper addressed the entire spectrum of the listed IoT security concerns (identification, authentication, 
data integrity, trust, data confidentiality, access control, data privacy and data availability) unlike the 
existing papers. It is only Riahi et al., that covered seven out of eight security concerns leaving out data 
availability. Second, this paper comprehensively covered the IoT security requirements whereas the 
existing papers partially covered this under privacy, identity management and trust management. Third, 
we examined the vulnerabilities in IoT, but found out that most of the existing papers focused on just a 
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few specific areas such as hardware or software, system weaknesses and policies used by the system or 
users of the system itself. This was also not as comprehensive as has been articulated in this paper. 
Fourth, compared to existing works, this paper brings out the integration of privacy and security through 
the proposed threat taxonomy that is presented in Section 6.  
5. Countermeasures 
In this section, we describe countermeasures necessary to mitigate the IoT vulnerabilities, threats and 
attacks identified in section 3.  
Bringing users into the fold requires designers and developers to understand that users hold the potential 
to be capable and informed about the elements of a system. Considering users and the various 
interactions they have with the system can allow designers to have a more well-rounded approach to 
understanding and ensuring IoT security [110]. To highlight the role users can play in protecting their 
privacy and minimizing their risk, we discuss steps that can be taken long before a cyberattack actually 
happens and what can be done when a hacking attempt occurs. 
Working toward ensuring users’ privacy and security should begin by considering what users are like 
before they begin to use an IoT device. Designers and developers should evaluate, among other factors, 
how users think about their safety, their motivation to be proactive in securing their information, and the 
trust they have in interconnected devices, as these factors will affect how users interact with their 
devices. For instance, the average user lacks an adequate understanding of the number and type of 
Internet-related risks to which he or she might be exposing him or herself [26] and the role he or she can 
play in securing his or her information [111]. This situation can be improved; an increased awareness of 
privacy threats and risks is correlated with the number of protective actions users report having taken 
[48]. We present below the countermeasures that include access and authentication controls, security 
protocols, intrusion detection, single sign-on, establishing trust, security awareness, privacy by design, 
and security tools: 
5.1 Access and Authentication Controls 
Access and authorization mechanisms are critical for the adoption of IoT technology. Therefore, systems 
access to authorized requests must be taken into account when developing IoT systems [112]. 
Authorizations techniques must verify if two objects participated in communication have been validated. 
The most common authentication techniques are a role-based access control (RBAC) and an attribute-
based access control (ABAC). ABAC converts privileges to a set of attributes assigned to an object, 
whereas RBAC converts privileges to a set of roles assigned to an object. Another technique which can 
be used to ensure authorization for IoT objects is known as Authentication and Authorization for 
Constrained Environments (ACE) [113].  
Martı´nez  et al., [114] proposed SMARTIE, an integrating user-centric platform for efficient but secure 
dissemination of IoT data in smart cities. The authors’ provided insights into the application of the IoT-
ARM to generate this platform. The main goal of this platform is to empower users to take control of 
their access control and privacy preferences to govern devices. The SMARTIE that is based on the IoT-
ARM guidelines on security and scalability provides architectural artifacts that enable easily and 
efficiently enforcing user access control policies. The proposed integrative approach is intended to give 
a user-managed, flexible, and scalable mechanism for access control to protect the access to smart 
meters’ data through the use of the SMARTIE platform. In addition to manage information, the main 
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goal of this platform is to empower users with full control on their devices through a policy-based 
approach.  
He et al., [53] in their study of access control and authentication in the home IoT noted that the current 
authentication methods for the home IoT appear transplanted from smartphone and desktop paradigms, 
which for the most part, assume a single-user-per-device environment. Through their online user study, 
they found major differences in the participants’ desired access-control policies for different capabilities 
within a single device (e.g., updating software, turning lights on/off, turning cameras on/off, adding new 
user, etc.), as well as based on who is trying to use that capability (e.g., spouse, teenager, child, visiting 
family, babysitter, neighbor, etc.). they were able to pinpoint various contextual factors (e.g., time of 
day, location of user, location of device, who is nearby, etc.) that, along with capabilities and 
relationships, dictate the specification of more complex, yet desired, access-control policies. 
Zeng & Roesner  [115] used the access-control policies derived from [53], among other design 
principles from other studies, to create an access control system for the smart home. The application 
included four types of access controls: 
• Role-Based Access Control: Each user is assigned a role — admin, child, or guest. Only admins 
are allowed to change access control policies, add new users, and organize the devices. 
• Location-Based Access Control: Users can be restricted from using devices if they are not 
physically near the device. 
• Supervisory Access Control: Allows a user who may be restricted from using a device, to use the 
device, if and only if another (authorized) user is nearby. 
• Reactive Access Control: If a user attempts to use a device they do not have permission to use, 
the application will ask a more privileged user for permission in real-time, by sending a 
notification asking them to approve or deny the request. 
For their work, the authors emphasized that the design of security and privacy features for a smart home 
must not limit a user’s primary use case for the smart home. To them, the user’s right to use the services 
is paramount. 
Yang et al., [116] proposed RFID-based solutions to address specific IoT security issues such as device 
authentication, device privacy, and network integration. The possibility of a device being stolen, lost or 
damaged made the prospect of attaching an RFID tag to an IoT device chip desirable. Their solution 
comprises a unique set of tags and device identifier, a session key, and a power path. It is designed to 
ensure a safe and secure delivery platform. Meanwhile,  Fernandes et al., [117] proposed a method of 
restricting access to IoT sensitive data. The authors have created a system called FlowFence that allows 
programs to control the use of data. The researchers achieved this by accessing sensitive data by 
blocking the flow of data identified by the user. The proposed solution allows programmers to divide the 
program into two modules. The first module manages sensitive IoT data in a test environment, while the 
second uses integrity constraints to coordinate the transmission of such sensitive data. An overview of 
FlowFence by IoT users has shown that data storage is minimized with limited growth. 
Le & Mutka  [67] proposed a lightweight authorization protocol that allows a user to easily transfer 
his/her access rights to smart home devices as a means of tackling the problem of delegating 
permissions. The protocol works by transferring access rights to a device in the form of a Bloom filter 
with the help of secured hashing to prevent the permission from being forged. The Bloom filters 
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prevents items from being removed and therefore, a user cannot recreate a permission higher than what 
he/she is holding but can still transfer lower permissions to other users. 
Recent studies have focused on authentication mechanisms that mostly deal with biometric factors. For 
example, many papers [118]–[122] developed unique touch-based authentication mechanisms for 
wearable or smart home devices. Alternatively, [123] presented a continuous authentication system 
based on geometric and non-volitional features of cardiac motion. 
Feng  et al., [124] presented VAuth, the only system that we found that provides continuous 
authentication mechanism for voice assistants. VAuth collects the body-surface vibrations of a user and 
matches it with the speech signal received by the voice assistant’s microphone. VAuth can fit inside 
things that people normally wear, such as eyeglasses, earbuds, and necklaces, Such a system can 
guarantee that the voice assistant only executes the commands that originate from the voices of 
authorized users. The authors evaluated the system on 18 users and 30 voice commands, and achieved a 
detection accuracy of 97% with less than 0.1% false positives, regardless of VAuth’s position on the 
user’s body, the user’s language, the user’s accent, or the user’s mobility.  
5.2 Security Protocols 
A security protocol to support data exchange amongst objects was proposed by [125] and combined with 
a security framework for enhancing security, trust, and privacy for embedded systems. Lightweight 
symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption in Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) were 
proposed to make the given protocol appropriate to the constrained nature of IoT devices. In [126], the 
authors propose mechanisms to ensure security at the network layer and at the application layer and 
perform an experimental study to identify the most appropriate secure communication mechanism for 
current sensing platforms. 
Li et al., [127] proposed a key-free communication method for IoT networks, which they called 
HlcAuth. Essentially, HlcAuth utilized challenge-response mechanisms for mutual authentication 
between the gateways and smart devices without key management. Through real-world evaluation, the 
authors showed that HlcAuth can defend against replay attacks, message-forgery attacks, and man-in-
the-middle attacks. However, for HlcAuth to work, the authors assumed that attackers are not within a 
certain range (at least 4.2 meters) of the gateway node. 
In [42], authors proposed employment of hardware-based Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), to 
enhance and enable security-related operations to be handled at the sensor level in IoT. Usage of PUFs 
will help in increasing the security level of the IoT, by allowing low-level security implementations on 
the things and also by devising cryptography software to perform special tasks such as verification. 
5.3 Intrusion Detection 
Roman et al., [60] argued that a key component of a fault-tolerant IoT system includes objects that are 
able to defend themselves not only against network failures but also from outsider attacks. Items in the 
IoT should be able to use intrusion detection software and other tools to hold back attackers. IoT 
systems are susceptible to hacker infiltration thus exposing users of the systems to cyberattacks. Any 
abnormal activities or situations should eventually result in the degradation and gradual cessation of 
service. Users, however, should be made aware of critical events as they occur. For example, when a 
malware attack is identified in one given device, users should be notified immediately of the increased 
likelihood of an attack occurring to them. In such cases, users should be encouraged to change their 
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passwords or take other necessary precautions so as to prevent theft of their personal information and 
compromise to their privacy. 
Although IoT users may be unaware of the large number of IoT interactions that take place behind the 
scenes, presenting warnings and sharing information about any potential cyber threats may allow users 
to jump back into the loop to make their own decisions about their safety. For example, a user who is 
warned that his smart meter has been hacked may decide to change his login credentials. For warnings to 
ultimately make a difference in protecting user information, users’ actions must be congruent with any 
warnings they receive [128]. A warning should result in users’ taking some action toward securing their 
information. Therefore, a hacking warning presented without useful information may be less effective 
than a warning presented with some insight on the state of the IoT system. For instance, a very basic 
warning may be ignored, whereas a warning about someone requesting remote access to a user’s 
information may be more effective at eliciting action.  
5.4 Single Sign-On  
In certain IoT contexts, single-sign-on (SSO) mechanisms can be useful, since users need to authenticate 
only once to interact with various devices. Users can then access all resources for which they have 
access permission without entering multiple passwords. However, traditional Web 2.0 SSO such as 
OpenID and Shibboleth were not designed to fulfill certain IoT requirements,[43] such as giving the user 
control over the choice of identity provider. Other mechanisms force users to employ a particular 
protocol, which can be problematic in a heterogeneous environment. Another issue is the lack of support 
for directional identities, in which objects broadcast their identities[77].  
 
5.5 Establishing Trust 
Trust is essential to implement the IoT. It encompasses how users feel while interacting in the IoT. 
Feelings of helplessness and being under some unknown external control can greatly undermine the 
deployment of IoT-based applications and services. There must be support for controlling the state of the 
virtual world. Users must be able to control their own services, and they must have tools that accurately 
describe all their interactions so that they can form an accurate mental map of their virtual surroundings. 
Since, devices in IoT can physically move from one owner to another, trust should be established 
between both owners to enable a smooth transition of the IoT device with respect to access control and 
permissions. Xie & Wang  [129] presented the concept of mutual trust for inter-system security in IoT 
by creating an item-level access-control framework. It establishes trust from creation to operation and 
the IoT transmission phase.  This trust is established by two mechanisms; the creation key and the token. 
Any new device which is created is assigned a creation key by an entitlement system. The device 
manufacturer must request for this key. The token is generated by the manufacturer or current owner, 
and this token is combined with the RFID identification of the device. This mechanism ensures that the 
permissions are changed by the same device if a new owner is appointed, or it will be used in a different 
department of the same company, thus reducing the overheads of the new owner. Owners can change 
these tokens, provided the previous token is availed, to replace permissions and access control to the 
previous token. 
In addition to encouraging risk awareness, designers of IoT devices should focus on instilling trust 
among users [130]. All devices should be able to perform their basic functions reliably, but in the case of 
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smart, interconnect devices, users should be assured that their information will be handled properly and 
that they will have the ability to revoke access to this information at any time. IoT devices are designed 
specifically to work with large amounts of users’ data, so a reduction in access to users’ information can 
be counterproductive to the overall goals of an IoT device. As such, it is important to reassure users 
about their device’s safety. Putting users at ease may involve including a certain level of transparency as 
to what steps are being taken to protect their personal information. Increasing overall levels of trust may 
lead users to be more inclined to allow IoT devices access to information they might not grant access to 
if there were doubts about the security capabilities of the IoT system [130]. 
5.6 Security Awareness 
Another important security measure for the success and growth of the IoT framework is awareness 
among human users who are part of the IoT. In [131] the authors explained the consequences of not 
guaranteeing IoT using real numbers. They accessed the IoT devices (SCADA devices, web cameras, 
traffic controllers, and printers) that were publicly available using the default password or without a 
password. The recorded results showed that many of these devices were actually accessible. If people 
continued to ignore security and use minimal security like the default password that comes with the 
product, this may lead to more harm than good. Hackers can attack the entire network if one of the 
devices is unprotected. 
5.7 Security Tools 
Beyond training, users can be equipped with tools that help them determine the safety of an IoT device. 
Researchers have proposed a mobile app that supports users’ privacy-related decisions[132]. A “privacy 
coach” in the form of a mobile app can inform users if an RFID privacy policy matches up with their 
preferred privacy settings. On the whole, these types of tools may make users more aware of their role in 
the system and what can be expected for their privacy. 
5.8 Privacy by design 
One viable solution is privacy by design, in which users would have the tools they need to manage their 
own data. The solution is not too far from current reality. Whenever users produce a data fragment, they 
can already use dynamic consent tools that permit certain services to access as little or as much of that 
data as desired.  
 
6. Threat Taxonomy 
In this section we propose threat taxonomy based on the security and privacy threats enumerated in 
sections 4.1.3 and 4.2.3, respectively. The taxonomy also captures the vulnerabilities and the mitigation 
strategies.  
Threat taxonomy divides the types of threats into different levels of detail. The purpose of this taxonomy 
is to create a point for solving problems, the ability to mix, adjust, change, and mitigate threats. In order 
to expand it, the threat taxonomy is a living structure used on the basis of collected data, from a holistic 
point of view of threats [2],[133]. 
Based on the vulnerabilities and threats identified at various levels of the reference architecture, we have 
combined them to formulate a novel taxonomy of threats for an IoT System. The taxonomy is illustrated 
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in Figure 3. From Figure 3, one can deduce that an agent or attacker operating within the internal or 
external IoT environment attacks and exploits the threats which may fall under security or privacy 
domain as explained in sections 4.1.3 and 4.2.3 respectively. The IoT security threats as outlined in 
section 4.1.3 include eavesdropping, spoofing, RF jamming, Sybil attack, sinkhole attack, man-in-the-
middle attack, denial of service (DoS) attack, malicious code injection, sniffing attack and spear-
phishing attack. On the other hand, privacy threats enumerated in section 4.2.3 include identification, 
location and tracking, profiling and interactions and presentations. The threats expose the IoT system, 
devices and users to vulnerabilities. There are several vulnerabilities which have been identified and 
analyzed from literature. However, we concentrate on a few key ones as explained in section 4.2.5. The 
ones covered include open ports, weak credentials and lack of authentication mechanism, weak 
programming practices, data leakage and improper encryption.  The IoT vulnerabilities are mitigated 
using effective countermeasure strategies. Most of the countermeasures explained in section 4 attempt to 
prevent, detect, and/or mitigate the vulnerabilities we described in section 4,2,5. They include access 
and authentication controls, security protocols, intrusion detection, single sign-on, establishing trust, 
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7. Open Research Challenges 
With more IoT devices entering the uncontrolled, complex world and being deployed in hostile 
environments, securing IoT systems poses unique challenges. The survey identified a number of areas 
that still confound researchers in IoT privacy and security. 
7.1 Security Research Issues 
There are numerous reasons for IoT vulnerability. First, in most cases, the components have little control 
and are physically affected. Second, most communications are wireless. This will make it easier to listen 
to the secret messages.  Finally, many components of the IoT have low capacity for energy and IT 
resources which prevent it from providing integrated security.  
Despite significant efforts on the issue of IoT security, there are many issues that need to be addressed. 
First, the safety of the end-points of the IoT is important because of the variety of smart objects used. 
Later, integration, encryption, profiles and privileges, open trust, and labor-intensive protocols became 
important areas that required further research. Effective certification standards must also be considered. 
Second, we need to pay attention to the IoT ecosystem. It is very important for ecosystem data to 
facilitate monitoring of IoT system components throughout the life cycle. Third, we need to discuss IoT 
interactions from an IoT security perspective. The IoT security research is deficient in human user 
perspective when it comes to security requirements, threats, and vulnerabilities. This area needs further 
research to determine user specific IoT security requirements. 
Fourth, while there exists a number of research efforts which propose IoT-tailored encryption schemes, 
we notice the shortage of studies which exhaustively and thoroughly assess and analyze their advantages 
and disadvantages under different malicious and benign IoT scenarios. Finally, we note the deficiency of 
remediation techniques concentrated on unnecessary open ports. These areas are fertile grounds for 
further research.  Fifth, while we note that intrusion detection techniques in IoT realms demonstrate 
advanced progress, some of their methodologies leave the room for further research. Indeed, relying 
only on IDS mechanisms in an attempt to monitor intrusions seems to be not very effective, since they 
only detect limited attacks. 
7.2 Privacy Research Issues 
The security work of the IoT has shown great interest in protocols and planning. However, there are still 
some areas of interest in the area of privacy. First, start programs based on the principles of data 
minimization, to reduce the amount of personal data collected and to reduce storage needs, when a large 
amount of data is exchanged between IoT players. Second, researchers may try to standardize IoT 
security and safety mechanisms to meet the requirements of new circuits and algorithms. Third, instead 
of expecting IoT systems to meet their needs, new mechanisms need to be developed to allow users to 
manage their privacy settings. 
The fourth issue concerns Limited Security-related Awareness Capabilities for IoT User. This challenge 
addresses secure access to IoT devices and their data. The possibility of an adversary gaining access to 
IoT devices by either brute-forcing their default credentials or by exploiting certain vulnerabilities 
remains a primary attack vector. This is possible with legacy IoT devices which are hard-coded or 
possess default credentials. We noticed that approaches which attempt to address this issue are rarely 
investigated in the literature. This challenge could be addressed by exploring techniques and methods to 
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increase users’ awareness about the consequences of potential IoT threats and possible technical and 
non-technical strategies to reduce the risk of exposure.  
8. Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to provide a review of the most critical aspects of IoT with specific focus on 
the security issues and challenges involved with IoT devices with specific focus on the human user. We 
have identified many security and privacy issues that need to be addressed by the research community to 
make it a safe and secure platform that can enhance user adoption of the technology. Research focuses 
are much needed in this area to address these security issues and challenges in IoT heterogeneous 
environments so that users can confidently use IoT devices to communicate and share information 
globally with safety assurance. 
In this paper we have identified threats and vulnerabilities that may hamper user adoption of IoT 
technology. The IoT security threats examined include eavesdropping, spoofing, RF jamming, Sybil 
attack, sinkhole attack, man-in-the-middle attack, denial of service (DoS) attack, malicious code 
injection, sniffing attack and spear-phishing attack. On the other hand, the privacy threats include 
identification, location and tracking, profiling and interactions and presentations. The paper also 
highlighted a few key vulnerabilities that may provide an attacker with the opportunity to infiltrate IoT 
systems or devices thus stealing personally identifiable information and other critical data. The three key 
vulnerabilities that may expose the devices include open ports, weak credentials and lack of 
authentication mechanism and weak programming practices. For this, the following key aspects should 
be considered to enhance security in IoT devices: access and authentication controls, single sign-on, 
establishing trust, security awareness and privacy by design. 
The first contribution of this work is the analysis and classification of IoT security and privacy aspects. 
The security threats such as malicious code injection and denial-of-service attacks have high threat 
levels while RF jamming, Sybil attack, sinkhole attack and sniffing attack have medium impact. Spear 
phishing is considered to have low impact. These threats could expose the vulnerabilities within the IoT 
systems and devices leading to successful attack on IoT assets. In terms of privacy of IoT, profiling is 
the most severe threat with a rating of high with other threats like identification or tracking, which are at 
medium level of impact adding to its dangers by supplying even more linkable data. Privacy threats such 
as interaction and presentation, and lifecycle transactions are rated medium as they too have an effect on 
user profiling. Linkage and inventory attacks have low threat rating. 
We also identified user requirements and challenges at the IoT architectural layers. We enumerated and 
discussed the threats, vulnerabilities and mitigation measures. We then proposed taxonomy of threats for 
IoT privacy and security. The model we have proposed integrates threats, vulnerabilities and 
countermeasures. We have also identified areas for further research. The research could focus on the 
safety of the end-points of the IoT, analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of various encryption 
technologies used in IoT, remediation techniques for the unnecessarily open ports. Additionally, 
researchers could explore techniques and methods to increase users’ awareness about the consequences 
of potential IoT threats and possible technical and non-technical strategies to reduce the risk of 
exposure. 
This paper has further determined that user-centricity is central to IoT privacy and security. Therefore, 
in terms of security, users expect (a) the devices to be secured at design and execution time (b) proactive 
identification and protection of IOT from arbitrary attacks (e.g. DoS and man-in-the-middle attacks) and 
abuse, and (c) proactive identification and protection of IOT from malicious software. In the domain of 
33 
 
user privacy, this paper determined that users want to have: (a) control over personal information (data 
privacy) and control over individual’s physical location and movement (location privacy), and (b) 
methodologies and tools for identity management of users and objects. In the domain of trust, users 
desire to have: (a) easy and natural exchange of critical, protected and sensitive data, and (b) trust 
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